1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This guide aims at providing specific suggestions and measures that comply with the Safety requirements for spent fuel reprocessing facilities (Trail) (GUOHUANGUIFUSHE [2018] No.2). Methods and schemes different from those given in this guide may be adopted in practical work, provided that those adopted are proved to be of the same safety levels as those given in this guide.
1.2 Scope
This guide is applicable to industrial reprocessing facilities which adopt liquid-liquid extraction aqueous process to dispose spent fuel from power reactors, including main process facilities for spent fuel reprocessing, spent fuel reception and storage facilities and associated radioactive waste treatment and storage facilities, and the like. It can also serve as a reference for reprocessing facilities adopting other reprocessing aqueous process.
This guide contains specific safety suggestions for reprocessing facilities, covering all important stages including site selection, design, construction, commissioning and operation. Moreover, specific suggestions for change, maintenance, calibration, test, inspection and emergency preparation are also considered.
2 General requirements for safety
2.1 Safety objective
The basic safety objective of spent fuel reprocessing facilities is to protect the working personnel, the public and the environment from harmful impacts of ionizing radiation. The basic safety objective runs throughout the service life of reprocessing facilities.
The main risks of spent fuel reprocessing facilities are nuclear criticality, radioactive containment failure, radiation exposure and chemical hazards, etc., so adequate technical and management measures shall be taken in site selection, design, construction, commissioning and operation of the facilities to protect the working personnel, the public and the environment.
2.2 Defense in depth
The defense in depth can be applied to the prevention and mitigation of accidents in facilities, providing multi-layer protection for activities concerned with nuclear safety. Implementing defense in depth in the design and operation of reprocessing facilities can provide multiple protection for expected operational events and accident state, including events or accidents caused by equipment failures inside the facilities or human factors and external events.
The purpose of implementing defense in depth lies in two points: first, to prevent accidents; second, to prevent possible radioactive and related chemical hazards in case of failure, thus preventing the change to a more serious situation. Generally, the defense in depth is divided into five levels. If any level fails, the subsequent level will act.
The purpose of the first level of defense is to prevent facility from deviating from normal operation and prevent system failure. The purpose of the second level of defense is to detect and correct the facility from deviating from normal operation.
The purpose of the third level of defense is to control the accident within the design datum.
The purpose of the fourth level of defense is to control the design development conditions, including preventing the development of accidents and mitigating the accident consequences.
The purpose of the fifth level of defense is to mitigate the radiological consequences of the massive release of radioactive substances.
The design features, measures and devices required for defense in depth shall be determined mainly through deterministic analysis during design and operation (which may be supplemented by probability study). This deterministic analysis, once reasonably proved by comprehensive engineering research practice and operating experience, can be regarded as the safety analysis conducted in the design stage for meeting regulatory requirements.
Grading method shall be adopted in implementing the defense in depth. When determining the number and degree of layers required for defense (independence, diversity, redundancy, etc.), the quantity and type of radioactive substances, the possibility of diffusion, the possibility of nuclear, chemical or thermal reactions and the dynamics of such events shall be considered.
The application degree of defense in depth at each level shall be consistent with the potential hazards of the facility, and shall be specified in the permit documents of the facility.
2.3 Quality assurance
The operating unit shall formulate and effectively implement the quality assurance program and executive program in various stages of site selection, design, construction, commissioning and operation. The quality assurance program shall include the activities necessary for the items or services to meet the specified quality requirements, as well as those necessary for verifying whether the required quality has been reached and whether the objective evidence has been effectively obtained. The reliability of process equipment and the operation safety of process system shall be ensured through adequate design, manufacturing, storage (if necessary), installation, commissioning, operation and maintenance as well as facility management including quality assurance and quality control, and inspection and testing shall be carried out according to clear and established executive standards and expectations.
2.4 Nuclear safety culture
The operating unit and the units providing equipment, engineering and services for it shall actively cultivate and construct nuclear safety culture and integrate it into various links such as production, management, scientific research and management.
2.5 Public communication
The operating unit shall establish a sound public communication mechanism and equip it with necessary professional strength to coordinate information disclosure, popularization of scientific knowledge, understanding of public opinion, responses to social concerns and the like.
2.6 Other requirements
The hazardous situations and potential events that may be largely affected by the reprocessing facilities shall be considered in safety analysis to ensure that adequate prevention, detection and mitigation measures are taken.
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Scope
2 General requirements for safety
2.1 Safety objective
2.2 Defense in depth
2.3 Quality assurance
2.4 Nuclear safety culture
2.5 Public communication
2.6 Other requirements
3 Site evaluation
3.1 Evaluation objective
3.2 Evaluation content
4 Design
4.1 General requirements
4.2 Design requirements for main safety functions
4.3 Typical initiating events
4.4 Instrument and control
4.5 Human factor engineering
4.6 Safety analysis
4.7 Radioactive waste management
4.8 Effluent discharge management
4.9 Environment monitoring and evaluation
4.10 Physical protection
4.11 Nuclear material accounting
4.12 On-site transport
4.13 Emergency preparation and response
5 Construction
6 Commissioning
6.1 General requirements
6.2 Commissioning program
6.3 Commissioning stage
6.4 Commissioning report
7 Operation
7.1 Operation management requirements
7.2 Facility operation
7.3 Safe shutdown
8 Decommissioning preparation
Standard
HAD 301/05-2021 Safety of spent fuel reprocessing facilities (English Version)
Standard No.
HAD 301/05-2021
Status
valid
Language
English
File Format
PDF
Word Count
26000 words
Price(USD)
890.0
Implemented on
2021-4-22
Delivery
via email in 1 business day
Detail of HAD 301/05-2021
Standard No.
HAD 301/05-2021
English Name
Safety of spent fuel reprocessing facilities
Chinese Name
乏燃料后处理设施安全
Chinese Classification
Professional Classification
HAD
ICS Classification
Issued by
Issued on
2021-04-22
Implemented on
2021-4-22
Status
valid
Superseded by
Superseded on
Abolished on
Superseding
Language
English
File Format
PDF
Word Count
26000 words
Price(USD)
890.0
Keywords
HAD 301/05-2021, HADT 301/05-2021, HADT 30105-2021, HAD301/05-2021, HAD 301/05, HAD301/05, HADT301/05-2021, HADT 301/05, HADT301/05, HADT30105-2021, HADT 30105, HADT30105
Introduction of HAD 301/05-2021
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
This guide aims at providing specific suggestions and measures that comply with the Safety requirements for spent fuel reprocessing facilities (Trail) (GUOHUANGUIFUSHE [2018] No.2). Methods and schemes different from those given in this guide may be adopted in practical work, provided that those adopted are proved to be of the same safety levels as those given in this guide.
1.2 Scope
This guide is applicable to industrial reprocessing facilities which adopt liquid-liquid extraction aqueous process to dispose spent fuel from power reactors, including main process facilities for spent fuel reprocessing, spent fuel reception and storage facilities and associated radioactive waste treatment and storage facilities, and the like. It can also serve as a reference for reprocessing facilities adopting other reprocessing aqueous process.
This guide contains specific safety suggestions for reprocessing facilities, covering all important stages including site selection, design, construction, commissioning and operation. Moreover, specific suggestions for change, maintenance, calibration, test, inspection and emergency preparation are also considered.
2 General requirements for safety
2.1 Safety objective
The basic safety objective of spent fuel reprocessing facilities is to protect the working personnel, the public and the environment from harmful impacts of ionizing radiation. The basic safety objective runs throughout the service life of reprocessing facilities.
The main risks of spent fuel reprocessing facilities are nuclear criticality, radioactive containment failure, radiation exposure and chemical hazards, etc., so adequate technical and management measures shall be taken in site selection, design, construction, commissioning and operation of the facilities to protect the working personnel, the public and the environment.
2.2 Defense in depth
The defense in depth can be applied to the prevention and mitigation of accidents in facilities, providing multi-layer protection for activities concerned with nuclear safety. Implementing defense in depth in the design and operation of reprocessing facilities can provide multiple protection for expected operational events and accident state, including events or accidents caused by equipment failures inside the facilities or human factors and external events.
The purpose of implementing defense in depth lies in two points: first, to prevent accidents; second, to prevent possible radioactive and related chemical hazards in case of failure, thus preventing the change to a more serious situation. Generally, the defense in depth is divided into five levels. If any level fails, the subsequent level will act.
The purpose of the first level of defense is to prevent facility from deviating from normal operation and prevent system failure. The purpose of the second level of defense is to detect and correct the facility from deviating from normal operation.
The purpose of the third level of defense is to control the accident within the design datum.
The purpose of the fourth level of defense is to control the design development conditions, including preventing the development of accidents and mitigating the accident consequences.
The purpose of the fifth level of defense is to mitigate the radiological consequences of the massive release of radioactive substances.
The design features, measures and devices required for defense in depth shall be determined mainly through deterministic analysis during design and operation (which may be supplemented by probability study). This deterministic analysis, once reasonably proved by comprehensive engineering research practice and operating experience, can be regarded as the safety analysis conducted in the design stage for meeting regulatory requirements.
Grading method shall be adopted in implementing the defense in depth. When determining the number and degree of layers required for defense (independence, diversity, redundancy, etc.), the quantity and type of radioactive substances, the possibility of diffusion, the possibility of nuclear, chemical or thermal reactions and the dynamics of such events shall be considered.
The application degree of defense in depth at each level shall be consistent with the potential hazards of the facility, and shall be specified in the permit documents of the facility.
2.3 Quality assurance
The operating unit shall formulate and effectively implement the quality assurance program and executive program in various stages of site selection, design, construction, commissioning and operation. The quality assurance program shall include the activities necessary for the items or services to meet the specified quality requirements, as well as those necessary for verifying whether the required quality has been reached and whether the objective evidence has been effectively obtained. The reliability of process equipment and the operation safety of process system shall be ensured through adequate design, manufacturing, storage (if necessary), installation, commissioning, operation and maintenance as well as facility management including quality assurance and quality control, and inspection and testing shall be carried out according to clear and established executive standards and expectations.
2.4 Nuclear safety culture
The operating unit and the units providing equipment, engineering and services for it shall actively cultivate and construct nuclear safety culture and integrate it into various links such as production, management, scientific research and management.
2.5 Public communication
The operating unit shall establish a sound public communication mechanism and equip it with necessary professional strength to coordinate information disclosure, popularization of scientific knowledge, understanding of public opinion, responses to social concerns and the like.
2.6 Other requirements
The hazardous situations and potential events that may be largely affected by the reprocessing facilities shall be considered in safety analysis to ensure that adequate prevention, detection and mitigation measures are taken.
Contents of HAD 301/05-2021
1 Introduction
1.1 Purpose
1.2 Scope
2 General requirements for safety
2.1 Safety objective
2.2 Defense in depth
2.3 Quality assurance
2.4 Nuclear safety culture
2.5 Public communication
2.6 Other requirements
3 Site evaluation
3.1 Evaluation objective
3.2 Evaluation content
4 Design
4.1 General requirements
4.2 Design requirements for main safety functions
4.3 Typical initiating events
4.4 Instrument and control
4.5 Human factor engineering
4.6 Safety analysis
4.7 Radioactive waste management
4.8 Effluent discharge management
4.9 Environment monitoring and evaluation
4.10 Physical protection
4.11 Nuclear material accounting
4.12 On-site transport
4.13 Emergency preparation and response
5 Construction
6 Commissioning
6.1 General requirements
6.2 Commissioning program
6.3 Commissioning stage
6.4 Commissioning report
7 Operation
7.1 Operation management requirements
7.2 Facility operation
7.3 Safe shutdown
8 Decommissioning preparation
